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Executive orders are not a viable route around political gridlock
In his recent State of the Union address, President Obama told Congress that if they continued to
obstruct rather than act, he would move forward wherever he could without them. One avenue for
such initiatives could be the increased use of executive orders; however, it is unclear if the
president can actually wield true power in this way. Using data on executive orders from 1947-
2003, Fang-Yi Chiou and Lawrence S. Rothenberg examine whether and how the president’s
supposedly independent actions are constrained by outside forces. They conclude the president
cannot achieve true additional power through unilateral action and executive orders are unlikely to
provide a means to work around a gridlocked political process.
The idea of presidential power is central to the study of American politics. Traditionally, much of
the scholarly attention on assessing such power has focused on whether the chief executive was
successful in getting his legislative agenda passed through Congress. Recently, however, the
ability of any president to get statutes through an increasingly polarized Congress has been
negligible. It is probably not coincidental, then, that scholars of the American presidency have
increasingly turned to assessing the chief executive’s non-statutory efforts as a means of
determining whether they can have a meaningful policy impact—presidents, including Barack Obama, have been
quite sensitive to this possibility as well.
Perhaps most notably, a number
of scholars have come to analyze
whether, or under what
conditions, the president is able
to move policy unilaterally
through executive actions.
However, whether such actions
make the president more
powerful has not always been
clear—sometimes researchers
have suggested that presidents
are very limited because of the
possibility of legislative pushback
or judicial reprimand, while at
other times they indicate that
these constraints are limited
because legislators find working
together so problematic and
given that judges are rather
passive.
This is where our work picks up, with the question: Can the president, through the proverbial stroke of a pen,
change policy in a manner that makes him more powerful?
Answering this query is quite difficult for a number of reasons. First, we need to define what actually constitutes
power. We then must develop and implement a research design that can assess whether what presidents do is
consistent with power’s exercise; the mere fact that presidents take unilateral actions, such as issuing executive
orders (EOs; the specific empirical focus of our research), is not tantamount to actually being powerful.
In our analysis, we primarily define power in the tradition of Robert Dahl as the ability to move the policy in a
direction more to the president’s liking than the current status quo without needing even the tacit agreement of
other political actors (notably, Congress or those running its majority parties). If EOs must push policy to make
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such other political actors happy—perhaps because they will otherwise react by making life more difficult for the
president in a host of ways (e.g., riders to budgetary appropriations or hindering political appointments)—then the
president is not truly being powerful according to this definition. In addition, we investigate presidential influence
arising from unilateral action by assessing how much policy is changed simply because of this institutional means.
With this conception of power in hand, we then build competing game theoretic models associated with more or
less power, focusing on presidential discretion over a particular policy. The key for our theoretical analysis is not
the amount of discretion that the chief executive has per se, but rather the extent to which its exercise it is
constrained. With contrasting models predicting different patterns of EO issuance over time, we look at which best
corresponds to the data for 1947-2003. However, before examining whether the pattern of issuing policy-relevant
declarations is more consistent with a model associated with one type of discretional constraint (i.e. judicial,
legislative, or political) relative to another, we need to sort out important from unimportant unilateral actions. We
do so by developing a new variant of so-called Item Response Theory that, among other things, allows us to
incorporate multiple “raters” assessing the importance of a given act and producing a single number of each
Order’s significance.
When we then use the number of significant EOs to examine which theoretical predictions are borne out, we find
that the model where discretion is constrained by political parties best corresponds to the data, regardless of
which specific threshold of EO significance is adopted. This is of great interest for several reasons. First, political
parties have not been greatly emphasized in the analysis of presidential unilateral action. Yet, we find that their
incorporation is crucial. Second, the model emphasizing parties is consistent with a world where the president,
rather than exercising raw power, is constrained by requiring compliance of key legislative players. Hence, we
suggest that any claim that presidents acting unilaterally are inherently powerful is overblown, as the reality is one
of subtle bargaining between the chief executive and other political actors.
Even if we do not focus on power
as we have defined it, and
instead concentrate on policy
influence or impact, our results
show that while unilateral action
increases the president’s policy
influence or impact, it does so
less than might be inferred by
previously scholarly work
because influence through
executive actions tends to be
substantially undercut by
Congress, particularly during
divided government.
In short, our research suggests
that, even when unilateral
executive action is concerned,
the American system of checks
and balances continues to loom
large. Along these lines, exploring executive action, at least in the form of Executive Orders, as a means of
circumventing a gridlocked political process does not promise to go particularly far. Such unilateral action will not
be a way out of the policy binds that a president may find himself in.
This article is based on the paper “The Elusive Search for Presidential Power” which is forthcoming in the
American Journal of Political Science.
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